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A VISUAL GUIDE TO NFIB v. SEBELIUS 
COMPETING COMMERCE CLAUSE OPINION LINES 1789-2012 
MAP EXPLANATION 
Though Chief Justice Roberts ultimately provided 
the fifth vote upholding the Affordable Care Act 
(ACA) under the Tax Power in National Federation 
of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566 
(2012), his was also one of five votes finding the 
ACA exceeded Congress’ power under the 
Commerce Clause. 
 
While Roberts argued that the ACA’s purported 
exercise of Commerce power “finds no support in our 
precedent,” Id. at 2590, Justice Ginsburg accused the 
Chief Justice of failing to “evaluat[e] the 
constitutionality of the minimum coverage provision 
in the manner established by our precedents.” Id. at 
2618 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 
These conflicting perspectives on “precedent” might 
prompt observers to ask whether Roberts and 
Ginsburg considered the same cases as controlling.  
This Visual Guide shows that though the justices 
agreed on relevant cases, they disagreed on which 
opinions within those cases properly stated the law.  
Both Roberts and Ginsburg implicitly adopted the 
reasoning of prior dissents and concurrences as well 
as majority opinions. The map illustrates how 
competing lines of Commerce Clause opinions 
constitute a long-running doctrinal dialectic that 
culminated – for now – in NFIB v. Sebelius.  
 
Note: This map is not the territory. This Guide does 
not purport to represent every case in the Commerce 
Clause dialectic. Rather, it highlights representative 
and influential opinions that define the basic 
genealogy of the current doctrinal debate. 
 
COMPETING LINES IN NFIB 
Roberts relied on the majority tradition of Morrison 
and Lopez as anticipated by Rehnquist in his Hodel 
concurrence. His understanding of the limits of 
Commerce power traces back to Cardozo’s 
admonitions in Schechter and Carter Coal and is 
consonant with O’Connor’s dissent in Raich. 
 
Ginsburg relied on the majority tradition running 
from Raich back to Heart of Atlanta, Wickard, and 
Darby. Her vision of a strong Commerce power 
traces back to Holmes’ expansive view of the 
Commerce Clause expressed in his Hammer dissent 
and is consonant with the dissents in Lopez and 
Morrison. 
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) (9-0). 
Chief Justice Marshall’s majority opinion upholding 
Congressional power to regulate navigable waters is 
the foundation of Commerce Clause jurisprudence. 
Both sides in the ACA debate claim fidelity to 
Marshall’s vision. 
 
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (5-4). 
The majority struck down a federal law prohibiting 
the interstate sale of goods produced by child labor. 
Though typical of pre-1937 doctrine, Justice Holmes 
wrote a prescient and blistering dissent that promoted 
a vision of strong federal power.  
 
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 
295 U.S. 495 (1935) (9-0).  
Usually recalled as a nondelegation case, Schechter 
also struck down provisions of the National Industrial 
Recovery Act for exceeding Commerce power. In his 
concurrence, Justice Cardozo articulated a pragmatic 
view of the limits on Commerce power. 
 
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (6-
3). 
The majority struck down a federal law regulating 
production and labor relations in the coal industry. 
Justice Cardozo dissented and argued the law 
conformed to the pragmatic limits on Commerce 
power he advocated in Schechter. 
 
Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin 
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (5-4). 
Reversing the prior majority pattern of striking down 
New Deal legislation, Chief Justice Hughes’ majority 
opinion upheld the National Labor Relations Act 
against a Commerce challenge. (Justice Roberts 
similarly “switched” his view in this case decided 
exactly two weeks after West Coast Hotel Co. v. 
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).). Both sides in the 
ACA debate implicitly claim fidelity to Hughes’ 
opinion, which marks the beginning of modern 
Commerce jurisprudence.  
 
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (9-0). 
A unanimous Court upheld the Fair Labor Standards 
Act of 1938 and overruled Hammer. Justice Stone’s 
opinion specifically cited Holmes’ Hammer dissent 







Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (9-0). 
The unanimous Court upheld the federal 
government’s power to regulate wheat grown for 
purely personal use under the Commerce Clause. 
Justice Jackson’s opinion represents the strongest 
view of federal Commerce power and is a bedrock 
case for ACA proponents.  
 
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 
U.S. 241 (1964) (9-0). 
Justice Clark’s opinion for a unanimous Court upheld 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against a Commerce 
Clause challenge. The strong Commerce tradition 
remained unopposed. 
 
Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation 
Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981) (9-0). 
The Court unanimously upheld the Surface Mining 
Act against a Commerce challenge. Justice 
Marshall’s majority opinion articulated a typically 
strong understanding of federal power. Then Justice 
Rehnquist, however, only concurred in judgment and 
invoked Cardozo’s opinions in Schechter and Carter 
Coal to suggest that pragmatic limits on Commerce 
power needed recognition. His opinion sets the stage 
for contemporary Commerce debate. 
 
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (5-4). 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the majority 
struck down the federal Gun-Free School Zones Act 
as beyond Commerce Power. Rehnquist implicitly 
adopted his approach from his concurrence in Hodel.  
In dissent, Justices Breyer and Souter appealed to the 
older line of cases like Wickard and Heart of Atlanta. 
 
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (5-
4). 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion built on 
Lopez and struck down a portion of the Violence 
Against Women Act. Justice Souter invoked his prior 
dissent from Lopez. The dialectic was in full swing. 
 
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (5-4). 
Although a majority upheld the federal government’s 
power to criminalize personal cultivation of medical 
marijuana, only four justices joined Stevens’ plurality 
opinion (Justice Scalia concurred in judgment only). 
In dissent, Justice O’Connor invoked the Lopez- 
Morrison counter tradition. 
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